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Introduction
The Civil Code of Ethiopia (the Code) classifies goods into corporeals and 
incorporeals* 1. Corporeal goods, in turn, are divided into movables and im­
movables2. The classification of corporeal goods into movables and immov­
ables in the Code can appropriately be termed as the primary classification of 
goods. Numerous other classifications complement such primary classifica­
tion of corporeal goods. These other classification of things can collectively 
be termed as subsidiary (complementary or secondary) classification of 
goods. The subsidiary classification of things includes corporeals and incor­
poreals, consumable and non-consumable, fungible and non-fungible, divisi­
ble and indivisible, principals and fruits, things in public domain and private 
domain, collective and personal assets, and ordinary and special movables.3
There are numerous factors that set the primary classification of goods under 
the Code apart from the subsidiary classification of things. First, the division
of corporeal goods into movables and
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1 The title of Book III of the Code which is 
entitled “Goods” as well as the reading of 
Article 1126 of the same implies that the 
subject matter of property rights under the 
Code is goods. In this Commentary, I have 
employed the terms “things”, “corporeal 
goods,” “property” and “goods” inter­
changeably to mean the resources, tangible 
or intangible, over which property rights 
may be established. The Code uses these 
words rather inconsistently.
2 The English version of Article 1126 of the 
Code classifies "all goods" into movable and 
immovable. The reading of the Amharic and
French versions of Article 1126 of the Code 
shows that what is divided into movable and 
immovable under this provision is not just 
goods but corporeal goods. See Billilegn 
Mandefro, Revised Unofficial Translation of 
Arts. 1126-1500, 1647-1674 of Book III,
immovables permeates the entire pri-
Civil Code (1960) From the French Original 
Draft, (AAU, Law Library, Unpublished) 
(1973-1975).
3 There are other classifications with secon­
dary importance under Ethiopian law. See 
Article 665/3 of the Criminal Code of Ethio­
pia (2005) which divides movable things in 
terms of value into those things with 'very 
small economic value'' and those things 
with higher economic value. See also Arti­
cle 669/1 and Article 681/2 of the same 
which deal with ''sacred or religious ob­
jects, or objects of scientific, artistic or his­
torical value...' See also Article 1094 of the 
Code which divides things with sentimental 
value (family objects) and those things with­
out sentimental value. Discussions about 
intrinsic and accessories and elements as 
regulated in Articles 1131-1134, and Arti­
cles 1135-1139 of the Code are not made 
here since they are an aspect of the primary 
division of corporeal goods under the Code.
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vate and public law of Ethiopia generally and the Code particularly.4 Second, 
the majority of the provisions of Book III of the Code are devoted to the 
regulation of the various aspects of movables and immovables goods.5 
Unlike the primary division of corporeal goods, the subsidiary division does 
not have a pedigree in the history of the civil law tradition to which Book III 
of the Code is traceable. Further, the primary classification of goods, which 
is based mainly on a lay notion of mobility, is considered to be fundamental 
in the structure of the Code. The primary classification implies the signifi­
cance accorded to immovable property in Ethiopia, be it in the past, present 
and in the foreseeable future. Finally, the division of things into movable and 
immovable is closer to common sense; such division is also thought to be 
understandable to non-lawyers. Hence, when it comes to classification, the 
Code is designed in such a way that the primary division would have far- 
reaching consequences while the subsidiary divisions would have compara­
tively limited effects.
The above distinctions do not however imply that the subsidiary classifica­
tion of things is trivial which does not require any treatment in property law. 
Nor do such distinctions between the primary and subsidiary classification of 
goods suggest that property law literature should offer a scant attention to the 
subsidiary classification. The differences between the two groups of goods 
do simply imply the relatively greater importance given to immovable things 
in the Ethiopian property law.
The subsidiary classification of things in the property law of Ethiopia is nu­
merous and quite useful to fully grasp the basics of property law. The sub­
sidiary classification of goods is valuable in order to settle some disputes. As 
will be shown later on, there are several issues of acquisition, transfer and 
extinction of ownership in respect of things which are not addressed in the 
Code by the primary classification. The subsidiary classification steps in to 
fill such gaps in the Code. Without the complementary role assigned to the 
subsidiary classification, many issues of property law would be left unregu­
lated in the Code. In addition, the uniqueness of certain goods (e.g., those in 
the public domain of the state) warrants specially designed rules. The sub­
sidiary classification can subsume the primary classification; and as such it is 
possible to craft property law of a given country without even making men-
4 The law of movables and immovables 
affects the majority of the notions included 
in Book III of the Code, contract law, 
agency law, law of persons, mortgage, 
antichresis, civil procedure, criminal law 
and commercial law, etc.
5 For example, the following articles in the
Code do exclusively apply to immovable 
property: Arts. 1207-1256 (special rules 
applicable to immovable property and use 
and ownership of water), Arts 1359-1385 
(servitude), Arts 1460-1488 (expropriation) 
and Arts 1553-1646 (registration of immov­
able property).
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tion of the primary classification of things. The use of division of corporeal 
goods into movables and immovables is not thus something that cannot be 
dispensed with.
Property law literature has given little coverage to the treatment of subsidiary 
classification of things. Moreover, the legal rules dealing with subsidiary 
classification of goods are scattered over the various sections of the Code and 
other laws, which make a comprehensive treatment of such rules a task diffi­
cult to accomplish. Apart from their sparse distribution, many of the rules on 
subsidiary classification of things are incorporated in the Code in a manner 
not easy to discern. Such arrangement of and approach to the rules pertaining 
to subsidiary division of goods in the pertinent legal texts perhaps makes 
them go unnoticed.6
This Commentary considers the nature, criterion, significance and legal ef­
fects of the subsidiary classifications of things under Ethiopian property law. 
This explanatory endeavor will hopefully make rules relating to the subsidi­
ary classification of things more explicit, accessible and hence less obscure to 
a student of property law. This Commentary relies on analysis of the perti­
nent legal provisions of the Code and the Commercial Code of Ethiopia as 
well as on comparative law.
1. Corporeals and incorporeals
The division of goods into corporeals and incorporeals is one of the multi­
tudes of subsidiary classifications recognized in the property law of Ethiopia. 
A corporeal thing is any product a human person can perceive whereas an 
incorporeal thing is any product that humans cannot perceive, but which has 
economic value.7 Incorporeal things are rights of property that can only be 
claimed or enforced by legal action and not by taking physical possession 
such as bank accounts, shares, trademarks, trade secrets and copyrights. The 
critical test for classifying things into corporeal and incorporeal products is 
human perception.
6 Recently, the writer has gone through prop­
erty law course outlines of five different law 
schools in Ethiopia in order to see if issues
related to subsidiary classification of things 
are covered in property law classes in the 
country. Assuming that what is taught is 
what is included in a course outline, the 
result is that such course outlines have not 
included the various types of secondary 
classifications with the exception of the
classification of things into private domain 
and public domain of the state, which ap­
pears to be included because it is included in 
the Code at a paragraph level.
7 See the Constitution of the Federal Democ­
ratic Republic of Ethiopia, Article 40/2, 
Proc. No. 1. 1995, Fed. Neg. Gaz., Year 1. 
No.1. This sub-article defines private prop­
erty in terms of tangible and intangible 
product with value.
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Roman law classified objects, i.e., all things whether or not appropriable, into 
res corporeals and res incorporeals. To the Romans res corporeals meant 
physical objects and included the right of ownership, which could be felt by 
the senses. To them res incorporeals meant, on the other hand, objects with­
out physical existence but having pecuniary value such as inheritance, obli­
gations and all real rights with the exception of ownership,8 which curiously 
was regarded as objects having existence in space. The Romans introduced 
this dichotomy since they thought that possession and obtaining ownership 
was thought to be possible in respect of physical objects only.9
Article 461 of the Louisiana Civil Code divides things into corporeal and in­
corporeal. Corporeal things, under this Code, are those objects which are 
made manifest to the senses, which we may touch or taste, which have body, 
whether animate or inanimate.10 In the same Code, incorporeal things are ob­
jects which are not manifest to the senses, and which are conceived only by 
the understanding such as inheritance, servitudes and obligations.11 The 
French Civil Code of 1804 does not provide for the division of things into 
corporeals and incorporeals. But authorities there have arrived at a slightly 
different version of this classification by way of inference from the joint 
reading of several articles of the French Civil Code, i.e., the division of es­
tates (biens) into things (choses, biens coporeals) and rights (droits, biens 
incorporeal).12 Such classification has importance in relation to the rule under 
Article 2279 of the French Code that states that possession is equivalent to 
ownership in relation to movables as such rule does apply only to corporeal 
movables.13
Under the German Civil Code of 1900, property interests such as ownership, 
usufruct and right of recovery may be established only over corporeal things. 
The law of property in that country does not govern incorporeal objects, 
which do have economic value and are the subject matter of appropriation.14
In the Ethiopian property law, the distinction between corporeal and incorpo­
real goods is important because there are numerous articles applicable to cor-
8 Roman jurists, conceived ownership not as 
an intangible thing but as a tangible thing 
because they were unable to distinguish the 
right established on an object from the ob­
ject over which the right was constituted. 
See Marcel Planiol, Treatise on the Civil 
Law, Vol 1., Part II 12th Ed. 1939 (Trans by 
Louisiana Law Institute) at 282.
9 Later in the course of the evolution of prop­
erty law, it was appreciated that real rights
such as usufruct and servitude could be the
subject of possession, and thus the formula­
tion of the concept of quasi-possession in 
relation to such rights. Id., at 341.
10 http://www.findlaw.com/11stategov/la/ 
civilcode.html (accessed January 10, 2008).
11 Id.
12 See Marcel Planiol, Supra Note 8 at 282.
13Id.
14 See Athanassios N. Yiannopoulos, Infra
Note 29 at 775.
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poreal goods alone;15 there are also provisions in the Code whose application 
is limited to incorporeal things.16 The relevance of the dichotomy also lies in 
the message of Article 1126 of the Code. The governing version of this arti­
cle classifies corporeal goods into immovable and movable. In addition, divi­
sion of things on the basis of corporeality is implicitly recognized in, for ex­
ample, Article 1128 and Articles 1347-1358 of the Code. One can also gather 
the division of goods into corporeals and incorporeals from the title of Book 
III of the Code by way of inference. The division under consideration is also 
enshrined in the FDRE Constitution.17
For the purposes of mode of acquisition and transfer of property rights, the 
Code equates incorporeal goods with those whose existence can be ascer­
tained by the senses. This division is of some importance in the law of pos­
session; in the case of incorporeal goods, the law of possession comes up 
with what we call quasi-possession since intangible things cannot be physi­
cally controlled in the sense of material assets. The possession of incorporeal 
things is expressed via the continued enjoyment thereof or by defending the 
right when the occasion calls for it. In the context of the law of usufruct, the 
beneficiary cannot make physical use of intangible things; her right is limited 
only to the enjoyment of the fruits of such subject matter.
For instance, a usufructuary or a copyright of trademarks or of a trade secret 
or of a share in a business association or of a credit or generally of an incor­
poreal thing may only reap the fruits thereof. It is not possible for such usu­
fructuary to think of the other right (e.g., the right to physical control and 
use), which she would enjoy, if her usufruct is constituted over a non­
consumable thing, say, for instance, a car. The law of loan envisages a con­
tract between a lender and a borrower in respect of corporeal goods for the 
latter is entitled under such contract to have physical control of the thing cov­
ered in the loan. The notion of license is introduced in connection with intan­
gible things. What accrues to the licensee under contract of license is the 
right to collect fruits arising out of the subject matter of such contract. At the 
end of the usufruct, loan and license, the usufructuary, loanee and licensee 
are required to return the documents that symbolize the existence of the in­
corporeal thing they have been enjoying in the course of the contract. These 
persons are not supposed to restitute any thing else to the owner.
The law of movables and immovables (the primary classification of things) 
does not address the rights of the usufrucutuary, loanee and licensee on in-
5 See Arts 1325-1346 of the Code which are 
exclusively applicable to things having cor­
pus.
16 See Arts 1347-1352 of the Code.
17 See the FDRE Constitution, Supra Note 
No. 7.
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corporeal goods. This is because the primary classification is intended, in the 
main, to focus upon tangible things; the terms movable and immovable nor­
mally denote physical things. These terms might imply intangible things only 
by invoking legal fiction. To the extent that the subsidiary classification un­
der consideration deals with the entitlements of the parties to contract of usu­
fruct, of loan and of license, it discharges its complementary role in the Code.
As mentioned above, under Ethiopian law, not all corporeal goods are the 
subject matter of property rights. Property rights can be established on some 
corporeal goods while it is not possible to create such rights on some other 
corporeal goods. Corporeal goods are the potential seats of property rights 
only if they can be appropriable. Besides, not all incorporeal goods are the 
subject of property law. Only those incorporeal things which are expressly 
designated by law as the objects of property rights can be regarded as such. 
For example, Articles 1128, 1309, 1310 and 1347 of the Code can be taken 
as some of such designations. Certain incorporeal things fall within the do­
main of contract or tort law. A person’s claim against a wrongdoer, or a 
claim of specific performance should clearly be put beyond the domain of 
property law because such actions are not directed against a person in respect
of a thing.18
2. Consumable and non-consumable things
The central test for the classification of things into consumable and non­
consumable product is consumability. Intention (animus) alone does not 
make a thing a consumable or non-consumable.19 Consumability is rather 
ascertained by reference to an objective criterion (consumption or alienation) 
and the prevailing notion in the pertinent trade.20 A consumable thing is a 
movable thing, which is used up when first used or subjected to transaction. 
One cannot use the same consumable thing again and again. In the case of 
currency, for instance, if one has a Ten Birr note and if she wants to use it, 
she would inevitably put the note into circulation not to find the same Ten 
Birr note again. Or, if one orders a meal in a restaurant, she will finish off her 
meal the moment she eats it all. She cannot keep on eating the same meal all 
the time. A non-consumable thing is a product one can use for a prolonged 
period of time. One does not finish off a non-consumable thing the moment
18 See Marcel Planiol, Supra Note 8 at 267­
270.
19 Stretching party autonomy to give them a
free hand to distort concepts based on facts 
and perhaps for apparently no good reasons 
flies in the eye of logic and common sense.
20 Under Art. 1713 of the Code in the absence
of a clear term in a given contract, the usage 
of the pertinent business community may be 
useful to determine whether or not some 
goods shall be taken as consumables.
58 MIZAN LAW REVIEW Vol. 2 No.1, Jan 2008
she uses it. One can use her house or ploughshare or table many times. Re­
peated use over a relatively longer period of time characterizes non­
consumable things.
Article 1327 of the Code attaches importance to the division in question, and 
the provision does not require a beneficiary of a usufruct to restitute the ob­
ject given in usufruct in the case of consumables. The usufructuary of con­
sumables is entitled to get ownership over the object the moment the usufruct 
is validly created and transfer procedures are finalized.21 The usufructuary of 
consumable things is, however, under the obligation to pay the value of such 
things calculated at the time the usufruct was created.22 In addition to such 
remedies, the possibility of returning things of comparable quantity and qual­
ity (to the bare owner) upon the extinction of the usufruct, is available even if 
such option is not preferred under Ethiopian law. A bare owner who has sub­
jected her consumable things to usufruct is thus entitled to certain special 
protections. On the other hand, a beneficiary of usufruct over a non­
consumable is obliged to properly manage, in the course of the usufruct, and 
restitute the object when the duration of the right expires because the owner­
ship of the thing lies in the bare owner.
The application of the loan for use provisions23 of the Code is possible in re­
lation to consumable things and so are those articles of the Code dealing with 
letting and hiring.24 It appears that a finder of consumable things, especially 
when they are perishable things, is mandated by law to sell them out at a pub­
lic auction and keep the proceeds thereof to the owner.25 A possessor in bad 
faith cannot be required to restitute the very consumable thing she purchased 
from a person without authority assuming that she has consumed them up the 
time of recovery by the true owner. Further, a possessor in good faith of 
some types of consumable things such as stolen currency and bearer instru­
ments cannot be required to restitute them to the true owner.26
21 Art. 1324/2 entitles a usufructuary to re­
quire at any time, advisably prior to the
commencement of the usufruct, sureties
where the usufruct extends to consumable
goods. Here the term 'sureties' seems to 
exclude real security if the usufruct is estab­
lished gratuitously. If the usufruct is created 
for consideration absent a contrary term in
the contract the usufructuary will be re­
quired to provide personal guarantee. The
Amharic version of sub-article 3 of this 
article entitles the bare owner to terminate
the usufruct over consumable things if the 
beneficiary is unable to furnish surety within 
a reasonable period of time or where she 
makes unlawful use of the thing; but in rela­
tion to non-consumable things, such things 
may be vested in a curatory.
22 See Art. 1327/2.
23 See Arts. 2767-2778.
24 See Arts. 2727-2766.
25 See Art. 1156
26 See Art. 1167
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The law of consumables fills the lacunae present in the principal classifica­
tion. In the case of the primary classification, transfer of ownership does not 
take place in the absence of cause implying transfer of ownership. But in the 
case of the law of consumable things, transfer of ownership inevitably takes 
place if the consumable thing is delivered even if the parties have intended to 
create usufruct or loan. The inevitability of such transfer arises out of the na­
ture of the things involved, i.e., they cannot be of some use without being 
used up or alienated. If usufruct is established on a movable thing, the usu­
fructuary is normally required to restitute the very thing she gets in the form 
of usufruct to the bare owner upon the termination of such usufruct; but the 
usufructuary of a consumable thing is not expected to make restitution of the 
thing given to her in the form of usufruct. Under the primary classification, a 
true owner is entitled to recover her thing from the possessor in bad faith, 
which is not possible in the case of the law of consumables if the possessor in 
bad faith uses such thing up. In relation to the issue of whether or not stolen 
currency and security bearer can be acquired via possession in good faith, the 
law of movables and immovables (the principal classification) leaves a gap 
covered by the law of consumables.
3. Fungible and non-fungible things
“Two or more things are fungible vis-a-vis each other if they belong to the 
same genre of things and if, by virtue of their physical characteristics or the 
intention of those who deal with them, they are interchangeable or substitut­
able one for the other in view of the end for which they will be used.”27 The 
key test for the division of things into fungible and non-fungible is inter­
changeability. A fungible thing is normally a movable that is capable of in­
terchange. Liquid and flour are fungibles. Normally, fungibles occur in trade 
in terms of number, weight or measure. One can exchange the same quantity 
of white (magna) teff with the same quantity of another white (magna) teff. 
Likewise, an Ethiopian Ten Birr note can be exchanged with another Ethio­
pian Ten Birr note. One can do the same in connection with the same quality 
and quantity of butter.
The possibility of replacement of one thing by another is not the only test of 
fungiblity. Parties, it may be argued, may declare a non-fungible thing to be a 
fungible thing or vice versa; the law may designate a thing to be a fungible 
thing.28 So there are four ways for a thing to become a fungible thing: its na-
27 See A. Precis, “The Classification of 
Things”, htpp://faculty.law.isu.edu/jrtrahan/ 
class.doc (accessed on January 10, 2008)
28 On the issue of basis of classification, De- 
molombe, as quoted in Yiannopoulos, says
the will of parties matters. Other jurists do 
argue other wise: while intention may be 
pertinent, a thing should be open to inter­
changeability in its natural state; the inten­
tion of the parties alone cannot... (cont.)
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ture of replaceability, party decision, the law, and notions prevailing in 
trade.28 29
A non-fungible thing is an object that is incapable of interchange. Unless one 
makes some sort of arrangements, it is not easy to have interchange between, 
say, a plot of land and a house, both being non-fungible.
There are instances of making use of this division in the Code in the fields of 
property, contracts, successions and civil procedure. The law of fungibles 
does help one to determine as to who shall be an owner of a thing in the case 
of merger. Article 1183/1 of the Code is one instance where two or more fun­
gible things owned by several persons are intermingled and could not be 
separated, or could be separated with excessive cost, the result of the mixture 
is joint property, prorate, of such persons. The possession and thus ownership 
of fungible things is transferred from a transferor to a transferee when, in ad­
dition to the conclusion of a juridical act, the seller “individualizes the thing 
(picks it out) or weighs, counts or measures out the required quantity of thing 
from her stock of things of the same kind”30 and makes a declaration to that 
effect. The use of the terms “a particular thing” and “a specific chattel” in the 
pertinent provisions of the Code suggest that only non-fungible things may 
be the subject matter of preemption, promise of sale and right of recovery.31
The other instance is found in contract law, which states the quality of the 
thing that a debtor must deliver to her creditor. Art. 1747 32 of the Code pro­
vides that where a contract relating to fungible things is silent about the qual­
ity of the fungible things due to the creditor, the debtor may opt to deliver an 
average quality of a thing, which conforms to the generic description of that 
fungible. In the case of non-fungible things, i.e., in case of specific 
(determinate) things, the creditor may, under some conditions, require the 
debtor to deliver the thing agreed or pay her monetary compensation for the 
subject matter of the contract cannot be replaced by another thing.33 A credi­
tor may not invoke specific performance with regard to consumable things.
28 (cont.) convert a non-fungible thing (e.g. a 
tract of land) into a fungible thing. See A.N. 
Yiannopoulos, Infra note 29 at 779.
29 A.N. Yiannopoulos, 'Introduction to the
Law of Things: Louisiana and Comparative
Law,'22 L.L. R. (1961-1962) at 778. One
may inquire into the difference between 
consumable and fungible things. Things
which are fungible are also consumable. 
However, there are things which are fungi­
ble without being consumable (e.g. video­
cassettes of the same record) and things
which are consumable without being fungi­
ble (e.g. wine of a particular vintage).
30 See Precis, Supra Note No 27. See also 
Article 1145/1 of the Code.
31 See Articles 1386 and 1411/1 of the Code, 
marking the words “...a particular thing...” 
and “. specific chattel.”, respectively.
32 The application of Art. 1778 of the Code 
also hinges on the distinction between fungi- 
bles and non-fungibles. So is the applica­
tion of Article 1145/1 of the same.
33 See Articles 1745 and 1747.
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The law of fungibles has importance in the law of successions34 and civil pro­
cedure.35 The use of the law of movables and immovables (the primary clas­
sification) alone would not enable one to handle the above issues. Thus, the 
concept of fungibles is embodied in the Code as a complementary tool.
4. Divisible and indivisible things
Divisible things can be split into several same units which can be assigned 
for individual ownership while that cannot be done in relation to indivisible 
things. Divisibility relates to the issue of whether or not physical apportion­
ment of a certain physical thing, be it a movable or immovable, can or should 
be accomplished; if physical division can be attained, if that is economically 
sensible.
Under Roman law, things were divisible if they could be divided into several 
parts of the same kind as the whole without thereby suffering diminution in 
value.36 Article 1340 of the Civil Code of Louisiana states that a thing is indi­
visible if the consequence of dividing it would be a diminution of its value, 
or loss or inconvenience to one of the owners. Article 752 of the German 
Civil Code envisages the possibility of partition of things in kind in relation 
to those things which, without diminution in value, can be divided in equal 
parts corresponding to the shares of the co-owners. “A thing is indivisible if 
it cannot be physically divided into discrete parts or though it can be so di­
vided, the parts cannot be used for the same purposes as the undivided thing, 
the parts are not of the same nature, the parts are not of the same value, or the 
aggregate value of the parts is significantly less than the value of the undi­
vided thing.”37
The Code and the Revised Family Code38 recognize the classification of im­
movable things into those, which are subject to division and those, which are 
not. In both Codes, the recognition of divisible and indivisible things is made 
in the context of co-ownership. Under Art. 1272/2 of the Code, a court to 
which a request for termination of joint ownership in respect of an immov­
able is made is expected to make order for sale instead of division where it 
finds such property to be indivisible either because physical individualiza- 
tion39 would be contrary to the nature of or purpose of the immovable or
34 See Art. 1047.
35 See Arts. 225 and 226/3 & 4 of the Civil 
Procedure Code of Ethiopia (1965).
36 Yiannopoulos, Supra note 29 at 780.
37 See Supra note 27.
38 Reference here is made to the Revised
Family Code, Proc. No. 213, 2000, Year 6th 
Extraordinary Issue 1.
39 In both cases of matrimonial property upon 
the dissolution of marriage and ordinary 
joint ownership, the law gives the ex­
spouses and the joint owners the right to 
insist on the physical partition, equally in 
the case of the former and pro rata in the 
case of the latter. See Art. 91 of the Revised 
Family Code and Art. 1272/1 of the Code.
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would reduce its economic value or seriously impair the making use of it. 
Under Article 1276 of the same Code, “joint ownership may be perpetual 
where.. .division thereof is impossible or would be unreasonable.” In the con­
text of jointly owned movable thing, the Code, under Art. 1271/1, appears to 
be silent about the possibility of termination through division; such Article 
simply envisages sale by auction.
The possibility or desirability or feasibility of division in kind of a jointly 
owned movable cannot be ruled out. The Code itself, under Art.1264 envis­
ages this when it stipulates that “each joint owner may at any time apply for 
the partition of’ fruits of a thing jointly owned. Thus, certain jointly owned 
movables can be partitioned in kind (e.g. some meters of cloth or a certain 
quantity of maize). The Revised Family Code also signifies the possibility of 
dividing movable things because it simply says ‘property.’40 Art. 92/1 of the 
Revised Family Code provides that “if there is a certain property which is 
difficult or impossible to be divided., such property shall be sold.”
Read together, provisions of the Code and the Revised Family Code de­
scribed above imply criteria to determine whether or not a given property is 
open to partition in kind namely: desirability or economic feasibility or prac­
tical difficulty or impossibility. It may be undesirable to partition a jointly 
owned thing for which the co-owners have developed sentimental attach­
ment. Undesirability of phyiscalization of marital property also exits; in fact, 
it may even be illegal for spouses to go for division of common property be­
fore their marriage is dissolved.
The issue of economic non-feasibility arises when the economic value of the 
units assigned to an ex-joint owner is exceedingly less than the economic 
value of the share in the thing before the division. Such non-feasibility 
should equally be said to exist when the size of the unit given to each joint 
owner or some of them is manifestly useless. The issue of difficulty or im­
possibility means that the thing, after the division, cannot serve its previous 
purpose or cannot maintain its existence. For example, a car is a composite 
thing and division of a car would basically means disassembling it and break­
ing it into spare parts. It is not possible to divide a plot of land on which a 
condominium is built during the life time of such condo.41 Nor are parts of a 
condominium intended for common enjoyment open to division in the course 
of the joint ownership of such building. A party wall cannot be partitioned.42
40 See Art. 92/1 of the Revised Family Code
41 See the Condominium Proc., Article 2/1, 
No 370, 2003
42 Art. 1201/1 defines party wall as opposed
to private wall as 'a wall or fence separating 
two parcels of land,' which may be argued 
by virtue of contextual reading to include 
buildings or parts thereof.
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The consequence of the dichotomy of things into divisible and indivisible 
becomes clear when one asks the question: should the jointly owned thing be 
sold at public auction or divided if one of the joint owners opts to bring such 
ownership to an end? If the thing is divisible, then the solution adopted is 
physical partition of the thing jointly owned and apportionment of the result­
ing units to each joint owner according to her share. In effect, each co-owner 
goes away with a unit of the thing co-owned. In so doing, the share of each 
co-owner is localized in some material portion of the thing previously co­
owned, which might lead to the extinction of co-ownership. If it is not possi­
ble to divide a co-owned thing then follows public auction or private sale fol­
lowed by division of the proceeds thereof among joint owners pro rata, which 
is called licitation.43 If the time for division or sale of the thing is not appro­
priate, it can be postponed for a certain period of time.44
The law of indivisible things is useful to remove one of the deficiencies in 
the law of movables and immovables. The straightforward application of the 
latter division of things does not offer a solution to the problem of bringing 
co-ownership to an end in the case of indivisible things.
5. Principals and fruits
The concept of fruits is useful in the application of some of the rules regard­
ing acquisition of ownership (e.g. via possession in good faith45 and acces­
sion46), joint ownership,47 usufruct48 and common property including per-
43 Supra Note 27
44 See Arts. 1271/2 and 1273 of the Code. In 
the case of movables, the court, upon the 
application of one of the joint owners, has 
the power to postpone the sale or division up 
to six months while, in the case of immov­
ables, the court can postpone it for a maxi­
mum of two years. The request for post­
ponement may be based on anticipated rise 
in the price in the thing or the thing is under 
construction or some issues of claim by a 
third party are anticipated. In the mean 
time, where necessary (e.g. the co-owners 
are in serious discord), the court may ap­
point a person who administers the property.
45 See Arts. 1161-1167 of the Code. Under
this provisions, though nothing is stated
about the fate of fruits obtained out of a
thing delivered to a person in good (in the 
case of stolen things) or in bad faith, it ap-
pears sound to argue that the person in either 
case should return not only the principal but 
also the fruits which she has collected in the 
course of the possession of the thing. This is 
precisely because she is not the owner of the 
thing in her possession and absent a contrary 
stipulation she who owns the principal owns 
the fruits thereof.
46 See Arts.1171-1283.
47 See Art. 1264 of the Code.
48 See, for examples of, Arts. 1309, 1311, 
1328 and 1331 of the Code. In relation to 
corporeal goods, a usufructuary has two 
rights: the right to use such thing given in 
usufruct and be the owner of the fruits 
thereof whereas in the case of incorporeal 
things (e.g. usufruct over trade secrets), the 
nature of the object of the usufruct dictates 
only the enjoyment of fruits.
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sonal property of one of the spouses49 both in the course of marriage and af­
ter its dissolution. These cases trigger the question as to who, and as of when, 
shall be the owner of the increments (fruits) of the main thing (which is sub­
ject to joint ownership, usufruct, pledge and marital property). The primary 
division of corporeal goods into movables and immovables lacks an answer 
to this question. Thus, the division under consideration here is set out to rem­
edy this deficiency in the law of movables and immovables as enshrined in 
the Code.
According to several provisions of the Code, which need to be read together, 
‘fruits’50 are increases of a thing in conformity with its purpose without dimi­
nution of the principal thing. Fruits are all that a thing produces at periodical 
interval without diminution of its own substance.51 If fruits are not obtained 
at a regular interval or produced using the substance of the main thing, they 
are called products, which mark the distinction between fruits and products. 
The term 'regular interval means production of increases yearly or at a 
shorter interval.52
Fruits are further classified into natural fruits and artificial fruits. Natural 
fruits are those fruits, which are the periodic increments of animals and 
plants.53 Artificial fruits are classified into civil and industrial fruits. Civil 
fruits are fruits, which are entitlements either by virtue of law or agreement; 
civil fruits do not come out of the body of the principal thing.54 Such is the 
case with interests on sums of money or profits from a business association 
and rents obtained out of a non-consumable thing. Fruits that may be ob­
tained by cultivation or workings on the soil are called industrial fruits (e.g., 
trees and crops)55.
49 See Art. 62/1 of the Revised Family Code 
which declares that all fruits regardless of
their nature obtained out of both personal 
and common property shall be taken as mat­
rimonial property.
50 See Arts. 1170, 1171 and 1333.
51 The French Civil Code and Louisiana Civil
Code do not explicitly define the notion of 
fruits; both rather come up with the classifi­
cation fruits as fruits of nature, fruits of civil
transaction and fruits of industry. In the two
jurisdictions, writers and courts have in­
ferred from their respective civil codes a 
definition of fruits which is things produced
periodically by a principal thing without 
diminution of its importance. See A. N.
Yiannopoulos, Supra Note 29 at 785. The 
German Civil Code, on the other hand, un­
der Article 99, states that:'' fruits of a thing 
are the products of the thing and such other 
profits as are obtained from the thing ac­
cording to its destination. Fruits of a right 
are the revenues which the right yields ac­
cording to its destination, particularly where 
one has a right to obtain parts of a thing or a 
right to yields by reasons of a legal rela­
tion.''
52 This is an inference from Article 1333 (a).
53 Marcel Planiol, Supra Note 8 644-650
54 Id.
55 Id.
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Products are fruits that may be collected from a thing by adding something to 
the principal thing mainly in the form of labor and raw material, which con­
sequently diminishes the substance of the principal thing. The Code assimi­
lates products to fruits under some situations. The assimilation occurs where 
products (e.g. wood cuttings, quarries and minerals) are collected according 
to the usage, in conformity with the purposes of the principal thing as well as 
agreed upon working plan preferably prior to the commencement of the usu- 
fruct.56 But it is not clear where the demarcation that separates the periodic 
and non- periodic products lies.
In terms of legal effects, natural and industrial fruits become property of the 
owner of the principal thing upon their separation from the latter. The general 
rule is that a person who owns the main thing also owns the fruits thereof 
based on Articles 1170 and 1171 of the Code. The ownership of fruits of the 
breeds is given to the owner of the mother should the owner of the father 
claim ownership. For example, the owner of a cow owns the calf without re­
gard to who owns the bull.57 Joint owners of a thing are owners of the fruits 
or products of such thing proportionate to their share in the principal.58 Under 
Ethiopian family law, fruits of both personal and common property are taken 
as common property.59 In principle, an owner whose possession has been de­
prived by another person is entitled to claim the recovery not only of the 
main thing but also the fruits thereof precisely because the main thing be­
longs to the original owner.
The rule that she who owns the principal is the owner of the fruits thereof 
suffers from exceptions. A usufructuary, not a bare owner, is the owner of the 
fruits produced by the thing given in usufruct between the date of creation 
and date of extinction of such usufruct.60 In the course of lease, the lessor
56 The Code creates fiction under Article 
1170/2, which states that ''periodical prod­
ucts of a thing and anything which may 
according to usage be derived from a thing 
in conformity with its purpose shall be 
deemed to be fruits.'' In the context of usu­
fruct, the Code prefers working plan to mere 
usage in assimilating products to fruits. See 
Articles 1333-1335 of the Code which en­
visage the right of the owner or the usufruc­
tuary to require the drawing up of plan of 
exploitation either by themselves or an ex­
pert failing agreement; the working plan can 
be modified under some situations at the 
request of either party.
57 http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-28554
(Accessed 16 February, 2006)
58 See Article 1264 of the Code.
59 See Art. 62/1 of the Revised Family Code, 
which provides that: “all income derived by 
personal efforts of the spouses and from 
their common or personal property shall be 
common property.” The corresponding pro­
vision of the Code, Art. 652/1, is not as ex­
plicit as, Art. 62/1, in this regard. In the face 
of Art. 649/2 of the Code, it might be argued 
that income (fruits) obtained out of the per­
sonal property of the spouses was not re­
garded as common property. But both the 
Revised Family Code and the Code use the 
term ‘income’ rather than the term ‘fruits’.
60 See Art. 1328 cum Art. 1331 of the Code.
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cannot claim the ownership of the fruits out of the thing covered by the lease. 
In the case of unlawful enrichment, the person required to make restitution is 
given the right to retain the fruits of the property he has received.61 In the 
event of return of the absentee, the fruits of her property collected by her pre­
sumptive heirs or legatees are given the option to retain such fruits.62
6. Things in the public and private domain of the state
Every state, irrespective of the ideology it subscribes to, needs property in the 
sense of goods capable of appropriation.63 Of course, a state with a socialist 
ideology is expected to have a lot more property than a state with a capitalist 
ideology. Property under state control enables it to carry out its classical 
functions.64 The state uses its property to discharge its roles.65 Take roads, 
bridges and national museums. Generally every body has access to these re­
sources. Ethiopian property law calls this type of resources property in the 
public domain of the state. As will be considered below, property in the pub­
lic domain of the state is a piece of property owned by the state but accessi­
ble equally to every body. Things in public domain may be immovable or 
movable things. Members of a given local or national community profit from 
things in the public domain directly whereas property in the private domain 
of the state benefit the public indirectly. Things in the public domain may be 
under the control of private persons though usually such resources are put 
under the custody of public authorities.66
As the reader may have noticed, the preceding sections of this Commentary 
have explained goods regardless of the identity of the owner of such goods. 
In this section, what is examined is the nature, classification and the effects
61 See Art. 2178/1.
62 See Art. 171/2.
63 The term 'property' is used under Arts 
1444-1459 to refer to the objects of property 
rights, not to refer to property rights.
64 These functions include the classic tasks 
such as defense, security and the administra­
tion of justice as well as the modern ones 
such as redistributive, allocative and stabili­
zation functions.
65 At present land and water including natural
resources, in Ethiopia, are collectively 
owned. These resources are automatically 
taken as part of public domain things; they 
may or may not be the case. Public domain 
things are different from common things 
(e.g. the ocean) and public domain things
are not the same as collective things (such as 
land and water in Ethiopia today).
66 There may be antiques (e.g. an old spear 
and shield) held by a private person. The 
public will have access to these cultural 
heritages in same way and the person in 
possession of such objects will have a lim­
ited ownership right. The heading of Section 
I of (Book III, Title IX, Chapter 1) the Code 
reads just “Public Domain”, which implies 
that if the property should be dedicated to 
public use or public service, it is immaterial 
whether possession thereof lies in a private 
or public persons. Thus, all property owned 
by private persons does not necessarily be­
long to the private domain and all property 
owned by the public institutions does not 
fall within the ambit of its public domain.
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thereof of things under the custody of the state. What the lawmaker seeks to 
regulate under Articles 1444-1459 of the Code is a unique category of prop­
erty both in terms of the manner in which the resources involved is sought to 
be used and the feature of the administrator of such property. This unique 
legal situation cannot properly be captured by the rules devoted to the princi­
pal classification of corporeal goods under the Code.
6.1 The Basis of the classification
The Digest, the principal Roman legal document, distinguished three kinds of 
state property, namely: (a) public property not open to private ownership or 
property serving public purpose; or (b) things which were destined to public 
use; and (c) property of the state or its political sub-divisions which was sus­
ceptible of private ownership and subject to the rules of civil law like any 
other property held by private persons.67 Hence, the Romans regarded those 
resources dedicated to public purpose or public use as property forming part 
of the public domain of the Roman state while some other resources held in 
the hands of the state but not so open to the public were taken as property 
forming part of the private domain of the state. Public use or dedication to 
public purpose was the distinguishing mark of property which formed part of 
the public domain of the state.
Article 1444 of the Code dissects property (goods) into two broad classes, 
namely property in the private domain and property in the state domain. The 
same article further divides the latter (property in the state domain)68 into 
private domain of the state and public domain of the state. The property so 
sub-classified might be held by political units at any level of the Ethiopian
67 See A. N. Yiannopoulos, Infra Note 69 at 
706.
68 See A. N. Yiannopoulos, Infra, note 69 at 
705. In Louisiana, state owned things are 
divided into three: (a) “things dedicated to 
public use; title to these things is vested in 
the state, but this title should be regulated by 
rules of public law rather than the Civil 
Code. The Code merely regulates only some 
incidents of the public use of such property. 
This is insusceptible of private ownership 
and thus exempt from seizure, prescription 
and alienation in general. (b) “Another cate­
gory of things belonging to the public do­
main consists of the things such as streets, 
public walks, quays and public squares. 
These things, dedicated to public use and
out of commerce, ordinarily belong to politi­
cal sub-divisions of the state. And (c) prop­
erty of the private (national) domains of the 
state is property susceptible of private own­
ership. Such property, though serving public 
purposes directly or indirectly, is not subject 
to public use. It is clearly alienable by the 
state, but, for reasons of policy, not subject 
to seizure and prescription against the state. 
To the private domain belongs also property 
of political subdivisions of the state which is 
not destined to public use. As in the case of 
similar property held by the state itself, such 
property is susceptible of private ownership 
and alienable but not exempt from prescrip­
tion.” See also Arts. 453 and 454 of the 
Louisiana Civil Code
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Government, federal and state, and regardless of the type of property, be it 
movable or immovable.
The basis of the division of state property into property in the private domain 
of the state and property in the public domain of the state is controversial. 
One view is that the criterion of the division must lie in whether a certain 
property belonging to the state is not susceptible of private ownership. 
According to this view, insusceptibility of private ownership is the criterion 
on the basis of which one categorizes certain goods into public domain of the 
state.69 This view triggers the question: are there things, which are absolutely 
insusceptible of private appropriation?
A second view states that the true reason for the dichotomy is dedication of a 
certain thing to the public service, not innate insusceptible of private owner- 
ship.70 To this latter view nothing on earth is inherently incapable of private 
appropriation.71 And the law makes the dedication. There are certain re­
sources, tangible or other wise, which shall be regarded as things in the pub­
lic domain of the state just by virtue of their dedication to the public use or 
purpose. It is to be noted that things in the public domain can be commercial­
ized while they are in the hands or under the control of the public authorities, 
though to a very limited degree.
The Code adopts the second view. It is not any innate attribute of a thing 
which makes it qualify for the category of property in the public domain, but 
it is rather the needs of a given community as reflected in its laws or prac­
tices or policy that makes a given thing part of public domain of the state;. So 
virtually anything open to appropriation can fall within the scope of property 
in the public if so declared by a concerned community. The fact that a given 
property is inalienable or is not subject to prescription does not mean that it is 
inherently incapable of private appropriation but the inalienability or impre­
scriptibility may rather come out of dedication of such thing by law to the 
common good.
69 See A.N. Yiannopoulos, “Common, Public, 
and Private Things in Louisiana: Civilian 
Tradition and Modern Practice,” 21 Louisi­
ana Law Review (1960-1961) at 704.
70 Ibid. Some tend to split this second view 
into distinct positions capitalizing on the
terms 'public use' and 'public service.' See, 
for example, “...the essential characteristic 
of property within the public domain finds 
in dedication to public service.'' As to the
third view, the essential characteristic of 
property within the public domain is dedi­
cation to public use.”
71 See A.N. Yiannopoulos Supra Note 69 at 
17. This is based on the realistic considera­
tion that, while all things are by their nature 
susceptible of ownership, consideration of 
public utility and convenience may require 
certain things to be withdrawn, entirely or in 
part, from the sphere of free private rela­
tions.
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The Code deals with property forming part of the public domain of the state 
without providing a clear-cut definition of the term. Instead, the Code gives 
us a guideline and some examples of property in the public domain. The ba­
sic guideline is whether a certain property is held by the state and whether or 
not that property is accessible to every body for use or destined to a public 
purpose.
Article 1445 (a) of the Code provides that a thing is regarded as falling in the 
public domain of the state if "it is directly placed or left at the disposal of the 
public." Article 1445 (b) of the same adopts another alternative criterion.72 
According to this standard, there is a certain good, and there is a public ser- 
vice,73 and the former is destined to the use of the latter in order to promote 
its particular objective. The authorities in charge of the administration of 
things in the public domain may charge fees. These fees are merely consid­
ered as service charges and payment of service charge to access things in 
public domain of the state may not warrant one to say such property is in the 
private domain of the state. The obvious implication of Article 1445 of the 
Code is that all goods, movable or immovable, in the hands of the state that 
meet the requirement of this Article will fall within the ambit of public do­
main of the state. In other words, all things the state controls and which do 
not meet the test of Article 1445 fall within the private domain of the state.
It seems that test of public use or public service under Article 1445 of the 
Code applies to situations other than the ones explicitly mentioned as exam­
ples in Articles 1446-1447 and Article 1255 of the same. Article 1445 is a 
fall back provision. That is, there is a certain property belonging to the state 
and that property could not fall within the scope of Articles 1446-1447 and 
Article 1255; then, recourse should be made to the test set forth in Article 
1445, i.e., public use (accessibility) or public purpose.
72 A.N. Yiannopoulos Supra Note 69 at 771. 
Things under the possession of the state and 
dedicated to a public purpose differ from
things dedicated to public use in that the 
public served by them is not public use. 
Like things dedicated to public use, these 
are susceptible of private ownership but 
only to the extent compatible with public 
purpose. In this category belong state-owned 
buildings housing governmental offices and 
educational and health institutions. Munici­
pal buildings housing offices and institu­
tions belong to the same category.
73 See Arts. 3207-3243 of the Code. In par­
ticular, look at Art. 3207/1 which provides 
for the definition of public service as fol­
lows: an activity which a public community 
has decided to perform for the reason that it 
has deemed it to be necessary in the general 
interest and considered that private initiative 
was inadequate for carrying it out shall con­
stitute a public service. On the authority of 
this stipulation, one may argue that the in­
vestment activities of some public enter­
prises in Ethiopia may be regarded as public 
service.
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Articles 1446-1447 and Article 1255 of the Code furnish examples of things 
that must fall within the public domain. As regards these illustrations, there 
would be no controversy for the Code requires one to categorize them auto­
matically into the public domain. Under Articles 1446-1447 and Article 
1255, mention is made to antiques one finds in museums, roads, streets, ca­
nals, railways, seashores, port installations and lighthouses, churches, 
mosques, fortresses, waterways, lakes and underground accumulations of 
water fall within the public domain of the state.74 It is submitted that there are 
many kinds of property that may be designated as property in the public do­
main of the state.75 For instance, the period of protection of patent and copy­
rights is limited under Ethiopian law. Enjoyment of these rights is not for an 
indefinite period of time. After the lapse of a period determined by law, the 
public is free to use patented76 and copyrighted materials whose duration has 
lapsed.77
6.2 Legal effects
The legal effect of the classification of property belonging to state or other 
administrative bodies into private domain and public domain is the applica­
tion of different rules to each of them. There are three options in determining 
which rules shall apply to the regulation of property in the public domain of 
the state. Option one is to regulate objects in the public domain of the state 
exclusively on the basis of private property rules. For example, in the Ger­
man Civil Code, “state property is in all cases private property; however, ex­
ercise of ownership rights is limited in the interest of public use and public 
purpose. The power of the state to regulate public use and public purpose is 
not regarded as an incident of ownership but as authority deriving from the 
sphere of public law properly belonging to the state.”78 * *
The second approach is to treat things dedicated to public use or public ser­
vice entirely under public law; here private law will have nothing to say
4 See also Art. 130 (a &d) of the 1955 Re­
vised Constitution of Ethiopia for additional 
list of things in the public domain of the
state which was probably reflected in the
Code.
75 For the additional list of property included
in the public domain of the state, see Re­
search and Conservation of Cultural Heri­
tage, Art. 2 (7&8), Proc. 209, 2000, Fed.
Neg. Gaz. Year 27 No 39. See also the
Ethiopian National Archives and Library,
Art. 2/20, Proc. 179, 1999, Fed. Neg.Gaz. 
Year 29 No 63.
76 See Inventions, Minor Inventions and In­
dustrial Designs, Art. 16, Proc., No 123, 
1995, Year 54th No 25: A patented invention 
falls within the public domain, perhaps be­
comes a common thing, twenty years after 
the issuance of certificate of patent in favor 
of the owner.
77 See Copyright and Neighboring Protection, 
Art. 20, Proc No 410, 2004, Year 10th No 
55. In broad terms, copyright expires fifty 
years after the death of the author.
78 A.N. Yiannopoulos, Supra Note 69 at 771.
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about things out of commerce. Article 714 of the French Civil Code appears 
to adhere to this pattern. Finally, the third approach is to govern public do­
main things partly under a civil code and partly under administrative law. 
According to Planiol, Civil codes should to some extent treat things in public 
domain for a couple of reasons: private property everywhere comes in con­
tact with the public domain and that the general classification of things be­
long essentially to a civil code which should “contain the basic principles of 
law.”79
This hybrid system is the preferred approach under the Code. The mixed ap­
proach rests on the belief that both public law and private law should in dif­
ferent respects govern property forming part of the public domain of the 
state. Titles VI, VII and VIII of Book III of the Code govern property in the 
private domain of the state and property held by persons other than the state. 
In other words, Articles 1126-1443 of the Code govern state property in the 
private domain. Article 1444(2) provides that ''property belonging to the state 
or other administrative bodies shall be subject to the provisions relating to 
property privately owned.'' The state owns property in its private domain 
same as property is owned by an individual or a company.
The consequence of this is that property forming part of the private domain 
of the state could be alienated (either freely or for consideration), acquired 
through possession in good faith, occupation, prescription and accession. 
However, if a certain property is categorized into the public domain of the 
state, Articles 1444-1459 of the Code shall govern it. These articles do not 
claim to treat every issue connected to things in the public domain; they sim­
ply provide one with skeleton. Articles 1454 and 1455 state that property 
which forms part of the public domain may not be alienated nor could it be 
acquired by possession in good faith80 or usucaption.81 The consequence of 
this is that state property in the public domain may not be alienated either 
freely or for consideration even by the state or its administrative units, which 
are merely regarded as custodians. Further, no one can acquire ownership 
over such property through possession in good faith or usucaption. Nor can 
one acquire property in the public domain through occupation (for they are 
already occupied) and accession.
6.3 Possibility of limited marketability
Property forming part of the public domain of the state is not absolutely put 
beyond commerce. The public authority, which is in charge of the manage­
79 Marcel Planiol, Supra Note 8 at 814.
80 See Art. 1161-1167.
81 These provisions should be read to put 
things in the public domain beyond the 
reach of attachment as well as prescription.
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ment of things in public domain, has certain powers, which imply that things 
in public domain under the Code can be subjected to limited private relations. 
Things in public domain may be given in concession of permanent or tempo­
rary nature to private persons. Such concession, however, must not have the 
effect of altering the purpose of such property.82 For example, if there is a 
national museum and if it has artifact shops and restaurants the latter may be 
contracted out to private individuals.
Besides, the public authorities may authorize private persons to occupy such 
property and construct works on the same.83 A certain street may be given 
out in concession to a private company to put up advertisements and permit 
others to do so with payment. But, in the course of such contractual arrange­
ment, the street will be open to vehicles and pedestrians. In order for an indi­
vidual to occupy property in the public domain, there must be authorization 
which specifies whether the person is allowed to undertake construction. 
Moreover, the character of such construction as well as the time for which 
the authorization is granted and the fees chargeable ought to be expressly 
stated.84
The public authority that gives the authorization or grants the concession is 
given the power to cancel the authorization or the concession if the private 
individual (beneficiary) fails to adhere to the conditions specified in the 
agreement.85 Pursuant to Article 1459 of the Code, the public authority is em­
powered to order the destruction of any work or the cessation of any activity 
by the beneficiary, which in fact impairs the very existence or the purpose of 
the property forming part of the public domain. The authority which is be­
stowed with the custody of public domain property should have the right, of 
course on behalf of the public, to bring possessory and petitory actions.86
6.4 Enlargement of the public domain
Article 1450 of the Code envisages two means through which public domain 
may increase or expand:87 expropriation and alignment. Expropriation relates 
to the taking away of rights in immovable property in return for advance pay­
ment of compensation for public purposes.88 The property taken through ex-
82 See Art. 1456 of the Code.
83 See Art. 1457 of the Code.
84 See Art. 1457 (2&3) of the Code.
85 See Art. 1458 of the Code.
86 This is simply inferred from Arts. 1148, 
1149 and 1206 of the Code that recognize 
the right of a holder to file possessory action 
against a usurper.
87 In addition to these two avenues, the state
may acquire property falling within the am­
bits of its public domain via investments, 
donations, excavations, accession and in­
heritance in default of heirs. For the latter, 
see Art. 852 of the Code. See also Art. 1194 
of the Code in the case of vacant immov­
ables without a master.
88 See Art. 1460 cum Art. 1464. See also Art. 
40/8 of the FDRE Constitution.
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propriation may enter the public domain.89 Alignment proceeding, on the 
other hand, helps the competent authorities to widen narrow or straighten zig­
zag or lengthen short roads or streets90. Where the alignment proceeding re­
veals that certain un-built plot of land falls within the public highways, then, 
such plot of land will be automatically incorporated to such public ways.91 
Alignment plans are particularly related to town planning.
6.5 Shrinkage of the public domain
There are three grounds on the basis of which things once in the public do­
main cease to be so and enter into the private domain with its apparent legal 
consequences. One such ground is declassification through declaration. Ac­
cording to Article 1454 of the Code, the pertinent public authority may alien­
ate property forming part of the public domain after having declared it no 
longer part of the public domain. The second ground for withdrawal of things 
from public domain is non-use. If a thing in a public domain, for example, a 
street, is no longer in use, it may be open for private appropriation. If a for­
tress serves no longer its purpose, then it would fall within the private do­
main. The third factor is a natural cause. For instance, a building in the pub­
lic domain may collapse as a result of earthquake or other natural disasters.
7. Personal and collective things
Written in the spirit of private ownership of the critical resources of the coun­
try, the Code could not envisage the division of things into personal and col­
lective things. This subsidiary classification of things has been added to the 
property law of Ethiopia since 1975. The division in question is still of some 
relevance because the FDRE Constitution has maintained collective owner­
ship of natural resources including land as the legacy of the Ethiopian revolu­
tion. This dichotomy of things helps us to identify things open to private 
ownership and those which are put beyond the reach of private ownership. 
This subsidiary classification is an attempt to link the wealth of an individual 
to her labor and to her material and spiritual needs.
7.1 Nature and basis of the classification
The term “personal things” is not used here to mean property owned by one 
of the spouses in the course of marriage;92 nor is the term under consideration 
used to connote human faculties which may be the sources of immense
9 This will be true to the extent expropriation 
is invoked to expand the public domain of 
the state.
90 See Art. 1450.
91 See Art. 1451 of the Code.
92 See Arts. 57-58 of the Revised Family 
Code.
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power and wealth.93 Rather, the term is employed as opposed to collective 
assets in the ideological sense. Personal things are resources owned by a 
physical person for her own survival, comfort, convenience and cultural 
needs as well as those persons living with her.94 Personal assets shall be 
linked to the person of the owner of such assets.
The term “personal asset” implies that the owner of such assets should not be 
allowed to accumulate property which would permit her to hire and exploit 
the labor of others. It also implies that the principal source of personal assets 
shall be the labor of the owner herself. The basis of the dichotomy of things 
into personal and collective seems to be an ideological preference. Personal 
things can be transferred via sale, donation, inheritance and attachment.
In order to ensure that the possessions of individuals do not grow into pro­
ductive assets, mechanisms are devised such as limiting the size, the number 
and the magnitude of such property. And constant nationalization is em­
ployed as well. Property in personal ownership includes “a one-family house, 
a one-family apartment, household articles, clothing and motor vehicles, etc. 
The list of articles which may belong to a person varies according to her 
place within the social and economic stratification in her society.”95
All resources other than those permitted to be owned by private individuals 
are taken as productive assets; productive assets are to be held and managed 
by the government on behalf of the public. Productive assets chiefly consist 
of natural resources including land and water resources and other key means 
of production.96 Intangible things such as patents and copyright may also en­
ter into the domain of productive assets. The nature and size of things falling 
into the domain of productive assets obviously depend on the stage of the 
economic development of the society which adopts this classification of 
things.97 * *
93 See Kennethr R. Minogue, “The Concept
of Property and Its Contemporary Signifi­
cance” in the International Library of Essays 
in Law and Legal Theory, Property Law
Vol. 1 at 15. Here the author distinguishes 
among personal attributes (e.g., quick wits),
personal property (e.g., the clothes on our
back) and productive property (e.g., farms 
and factories). Minogue thinks that all the
three categories of property might be the 
source of immense influence on others.
94 See Articles 10-18 of the 1977 Soviet Con­
stitution. In 1987, Ethiopia followed the 
footsteps of the ex-USSR when it adopted a 
constitution which reproduced a verbatim 
copy of these provisions on the forms of 
property. See Articles 12-18 of the PDRE 
Constitution.
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7.2 Reasons for the classification
It is argued by the proponents of socialism that some of these assets are the 
products of nature and created by no one but by nature for every one.98 Some 
of these assets are produced by the capitalist class not as a result of its own 
innovative power but due to monopoly over state power and years of merci­
less exploitation of the working class. Thus, these resources shall be pos­
sessed by the state in the name of all its citizens. Citizens will have indirect 
benefit from some of these resources. In relation to others such as land, citi­
zens will have individual access to the same and will enjoy proprietary rights 
over such resources but short of ownership. No single person, be it an indi­
vidual or an association or even the government, shall have command in the 
sense of possessing ultimate say over these resources.99 Collective things are 
seen as a heritage of nature and past generations; to be used for the common 
good by the present generation and to be passed onto the future generation.
7.3 Implications of the classification
The classification of resources into personal and productive is featured 
uniquely by gradation in the protection of which the law offers to each of 
these classes. The property of the state as the foundation of the social and 
economic order calls for the highest degree of protection. For example, of the 
property in private (individual) ownership, only the property of working 
peasants and artisans enjoys the protection of the state. The motivation be­
hind the varying degree of protection is to ensure that private property must 
not prejudice public interest.
Special protection of socialist property is primarily reflected in the fact that 
the law makes it impossible to transfer objects of socialist ownership into any 
other ownership. Transfer of property from one socialist ownership into any 
other has little legal significance as it always remains in state ownership and 
the socialist juristic persons “merely exercise the right of ownership vested in 
the state in their own name with regard to assets in their management.”100
The state is the sole owner of all state property, regardless of what it is or 
who manages or uses it; state organizations exercise within the limits estab­
lished by law only the right of possession, use, and disposal of state property 
attached to them in accordance with the aims of their property and the pur­
pose of the property. State property is not subject to attachment by creditors; 
execution of creditors' claim may apply only to raw material, fuels and other
100 Kazimierz Grzybowski, Reform of Civil 
Law in Hungary, Poland and Soviet Union, 
10 Am.J.Comp.L3 (1961) at 261-262.
8 Id.
9 Id.
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property included in the working capital of state organization.101 Nor is it 
open to prescription. A person may by taking possession thereof, acquire 
ownership of the usual objects of personal property in case they have no 
owner, and other things shall become the property of the state.102
Countries including Ethiopia that claimed to have adhered to Marxist doc­
trine in the past recognized the distinction between personal and productive 
assets. In those countries the use of the term ‘private things’ was deliberately 
avoided as that was said to carry with it the connotation of unbridled accu­
mulation of private holdings. The provisions of the PDRE Constitution 
(1987) dealing with property were a verbatim copy of Articles 10-18 of the 
Soviet Constitution of 1977. These provisions of the PDRE Constitution 
merely restated the legislative pronouncements regarding forms of ownership 
the then government of Ethiopia had been issuing between 1974 and 1986.103 
Articles 12-18 of the PDRE Constitution provided that:
The forms of ownership of the means of production are socialist, that is, state 
and cooperative ownership, private ownership and other forms of ownership 
as determined by law. State ownership is public ownership. The Ethiopian 
State shall, through the ownership of key production, distribution and service 
enterprises, play the leading role in the economy. Natural resources, in par­
ticular land, minerals, water and forest, are state property. Private ownership 
shall, guided by state policy, carry out activities beneficial to the national 
economy. The right to transfer private ownership in accordance with the law 
is guaranteed. Personal property is protected by law. The right to transfer per­
sonal property in accordance with the law is guaranteed. The state may, where 
public interest so requires, purchase, requisition [sic: expropriation for im­
movable] by making appropriate payment, or nationalize upon payment of 
compensation, any property in accordance with the law. Labor is an honorable 
source of wealth and well being of the society. The social standing of any 
person shall be determined by his work.
When read together with other proclamations regulating the ownership of the 
means of production,104 these constitutional prescriptions virtually abolished 
private ownership of property except in the trivialized sense of the term.105 
As the above quotation indicates, a mechanism of constant nationalization
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 The term 'collective ownership' has not 
been consistently used in statutes in Ethio­
pia. Collective ownership, public ownership, 
government ownership and state ownership 
are terms used interchangeably.
104 See Public Ownership of Rural Lands 
Proc. No 31, 1975, Neg. Gaz. Year 34 No
26. See Also Government Ownership of 
Urban Lands and Extra Houses, Proc No 47, 
1975, Neg. Gaz. Year 34, No 41.
105 Farmers could have use right over a plot of 
land whose size was limited by legislation 
and practice, too. Urban dwellers could not 
own more than one dwelling house; when 
they elected to sell such house the state was 
privileged to have preemption right. (cont.)
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was built into these statutes to nib at its bud of any sign of increase in the size 
of personal assets.
7.4 Distinctions
A description of things analogous to, yet different from collective things is in 
order. Collectively owned things are different from common things though 
there are many similarities. Common things also called universal things (e.g. 
the sun, the moon, the atmospheric air and the high seas) cannot be owned by 
any entity even by the state in their entirety though that may be possible as a 
matter of theory. “Common things are those which do not belong to any body 
and which may be used by all, e.g., the air, the sea, the river water, the solar 
heat. They are so abundant, that every one may take of them what he needs 
without depriving any body else.”105 106 These are resources dedicated to man­
kind in general whether such resources are traced to, as done by writers of 
religious inclination to the workmanship of God or taken as gift of nature as 
claimed by writers of secular orientation.
There are several common bonds between collective things and things in the 
public domain of the state. Both are controlled by the state indefinitely. Both 
are held and managed by the state in the name of the entire nation in order to 
avoid conflict of the wills of the multitude and unbearable transaction costs. 
The state shall deploy both to the betterment of its citizens. Citizens are enti­
tled without distinction to benefit either directly or indirectly from such re­
sources. Moreover, in both cases one is not expected to buy her way in for 
membership is open and free. Hence, the essential commonalities between 
collective assets and things in the public domain are understood if two ques­
tions are posed: who is entitled to have beneficial interests in such resources 
(all citizens) and in whom the power to make decisions regarding the same is 
vested (state authorities)?
Collective things are confused in some property law literature with things in 
the public domain. For example, a distinguished property treatise writer said:
...there is a common usage of collectively owned thing or there is a complete
dedication of it to the general service, which in many cases can be had without
105 (cont.) Small businesses were allowed 
only in the course of so called transitional
period and even in that case a capital ceil­
ing was put in place. This approach was 
pretty much similar to the approach taken 
by the Soviet property law which abolished 
private property in principle and recog­
nized small ownership in contrast with the 
Bulgarian property law approach which did
permit private ownership in principle but 
prohibited large scale ownership. See N. 
Dolapchiev, Law and Human Rights in 
Bulgaria,29 International Affairs 7(1953) 
at 65.
106 Aubry and Rau, Droit Civil Francais,Vol. 
II, 7th ed. (An English Translation by the 
Louisiana Law Institute), (St. Paul Minn 
West Publishing Co.) (1966).
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any contact with the thing used; it is thus the entire nation that derives an advan­
tage from its battleships and its forts, although the citizens themselves, individu­
ally, make no use of them and are not in possession of them and many have not 
even seen them...107
Yet, the two classes of things are different in important respects. The above 
quotation may apply to things in the public domain of the state, but not nec­
essarily to collectively owned resources for citizens may have the opportu­
nity to have individual and direct enjoyment of collectively owned property. 
For example, in Ethiopia, both urban and rural lands are collectively owned 
but, for instance, plots are allotted to each farmer who has individual exclu­
sive possession over such plot.
Secondly, one can imagine a thing in the public domain (e.g. a shield which 
can be taken as antique), which is in possession of a private person whose 
ownership right is limited by virtue of the character of the thing she owns. 
Technically speaking, heritages held by mosques and churches are within 
private domain as these institutions are not part of the state and are estab­
lished and sustained by private initiatives. But, for all practical purposes, 
cultural heritages held by mosques and churches in Ethiopia are part of the 
public domain. In the case of collective assets, they are held by the state (or 
at least by association of persons mandated by the state) to manage a given 
resource to the common good.
Third, collective ownership is often, if not always, ideologically motivated. 
Collective assets, as history witnesses, usually result from nationalization. 
On the other hand, things in the public domain of the state do not necessarily 
have a bearing on assault against private possessions by way of nationaliza- 
tion.108 It is not possible or feasible or desirable to individualize and confer 
exclusive possession on individuals in respect of at least some of the things 
in the public domain. Yet, physical apportionment in order to bestow exclu­
sive property rights on individuals in respect of a collective asset (e.g. land) 
may be seen as possible or feasible and even desirable, at least from the per­
spective of some people.
7 See Marcel Planoil, Supra Note 8 at 800­
801. Another writer, M. Ducrocq made a 
similar confusion in writing:: “If the citizens 
were the owners of the national or commu­
nal property, they would be entitled to ask 
for its partition, for they would be the own­
ers of undivided property and nobody can be 
forced to remain in in-division. the result 
would be the spoliation of future generation 
and the destruction of the domain of the
state in favor of the generation of then liv­
ing. If the citizens cannot sue for partition, it 
is not because the national property is 
owned by a fictitious person, who would be 
a fantastic person, but it is because there are 
two ways of being owner. And collective 
ownership lasts as long as its dedication to 
the collectivity does not entail partition..”
108 See Marcel Planoil, Supra Note 8.
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Collectively owned things are not the same as jointly owned things which are 
in the state of in-division. Collective ownership suppresses the autonomy of 
individual shares; those shares do not exist in the sense that the individual, 
even if she is considered as an owner, cannot exercise the rights attached to 
ownership.
On the other hand, joint ownership permits the autonomy of the individual 
because individual property subsists in shares. In the case of joint ownership, 
each of the shares, even if it is physically merged into the others, has its spe­
cial owner; undivided co-ownership is always individual ownership with 
physical merging of the shares.109 Collective ownership, on the other hand, 
rests upon the necessary grouping together of the person to which it belongs 
and such things are not intended to become the subject matter of private
ownership.110
8. Ordinary movables and special movables
Mere adherence to the major scheme of classification of goods in the Code, 
i.e., the law of movables and immovables, leaves many issues of acquisition 
and transfer of movables unanswered. The same procedure of transfer does 
not apply to all kinds of movables. And not all movables are subject to the 
law of possession in good faith. Thus, a distinction among movables is neces­
sary to identify the proper rules of transfer and acquisition of ownership re­
garding movables.
Recognition of the division of movable things into ordinary and special can 
be inferred from Articles 1186/2, 2267/2 and 3047/2 of the Code. Special 
movables may be corporeal (e.g. motor vehicles) or incorporeal (e.g. busi­
ness).111 The basis of this dichotomy of movable things into special and ordi­
nary seems to hinge entirely on the wishes of the legislature. When the legis­
lature deems it appropriate to single out a movable thing and put it in the 
category of special movable, that is all to it. Some movables are seen by the 
lawmaker as deserving special treatment because of a combination of many 
factors such as their economic value (e.g. aircrafts and ships112), security rea­
sons (e.g. arms) and the need to ensure continued enjoyment by debtors after 
such things are given in the form of security (e.g. construction machinery).
109 Id
110 Id
111 See Art. 124 of the Commercial Code 
which treats business as a special movable.
There are other laws which give special
treatment to some movables. For e.g. TV 
sets, motor vehicles, construction machinery
and arms are considered by separate law as 
special movables.
112 For the purposes of transfer, ships, vessels 
and airplanes are assimilated to immovable 
property in France and Louisiana. See A. N. 
Yiannoplous, “Movables and Immovables in 
Louisiana and Comparative Law,” 22 L.L.R. 
(1961-1962) at 561. "
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This section explains rules applicable to ordinary movables and special mov­
ables, distinguishes special movables from ordinary movables, and comments 
on rules applicable to motor vehicles and shares in business associations.
8.1 Ordinary movables
Every movable which has not been classified by the law as a special movable 
is an ordinary movable. Registration is unnecessary to effect transfer of own­
ership over ordinary movables. Moreover, there is no need to secure a title 
certificate in connection with ordinary movables. In order to transfer owner­
ship over ordinary movables there is a need to have cause in the sense al­
ready mentioned, i.e., juridical act (contract or testament) or law (court or­
der). In addition, there is a need to effect delivery of the ordinary movable 
from the transferor to the transferee. In French law, an intention to transfer 
ownership as expressed in a valid agreement without the need to effect deliv­
ery is good enough to transfer ownership over movables.113 In Germany, 
however, an intention to transfer ownership as indicated in an agreement fol­
lowed by delivery leads to transfer of ownership in respect of movables.114
The Ethiopian law of ordinary movables has followed the German approach. 
Under Article 2274 of the Code, delivery involves the handing over of a 
thing and its accessories to the transferee. Article 2274 of the Code offers just 
one type and the most common sense of delivery.115 In respect of ordinary 
movables, delivery leads to possession, which in turn leads to the presump-
113 K.W. Ryan, “An Introduction to The Civil 
Law”, (Australia, The Law Book Co. Of 
Australasia PTY LTD., 1962) at 170-171.
114 Id.
115 Roman law gave recognition to various 
types of delivery. Constitutum possessorium 
refers to the case where a transferor in pos­
session could agree to transfer ownership 
but to retain possession of the thing in some 
other capacity than that of owner. Traditio 
brevi manu occurs when a transferee was in 
possession of the thing, but not as owner, an 
agreement that she should become the owner 
would transfer the ownership to her. Tradi­
tio longa manu is the situation where the 
transferor could point out a thing to the 
transferee and authorize her to take such 
thing at her will; traditio per cartam, liter­
ally means agreements alone, the delivery of 
a written agreement instead of delivery of
the thing; here clauses would be inserted in 
the agreement under which the owner di­
vested herself of ownership and retains pos­
session as a mere detentor. The fifth form is 
agreement followed by actual handing over 
the subject matter to the transferee, i.e., ac­
tual delivery. In these five cases, Roman 
law put one common central condition, 
which is the transferor should intend to part 
with ownership and the transferee shall in­
tend to obtain ownership. Under Roman 
property law, if a seller intends to sell a 
movable thing and the buyer intends it to be 
a gift, title may pass. On the other hand, if 
the seller intends loan while the buyer in­
tends a gift or sale, there is no unity of mind 
and thus title would not pass. W.W. Buck- 
land, “A Manual of Roman Private Law,” 
2ed. (1953) at 133-136. Some of these
modes of delivery are incorporated in Arts 
1144, 1145 and 1147 of the Code.
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tion of ownership.116 Simply stated, she who possesses an ordinary movable 
is assumed to hold it for herself and to be owner thereof. As ownership over 
ordinary corporeal movables may be transferred when possession is trans­
ferred, whosoever is in possession of an ordinary movable is presumed to 
possess it on her own behalf and to be the owner of such thing.117 If anybody 
disputes such ownership, the obligation to disprove such presumption is 
borne by the disputing party.118 For instance, a bare owner will surely rebut 
the presumption that a movable thing she has given in usufruct is owned by 
the usufructuary. A pledgor and an owner of a lost thing may set aside an in­
ference of ownership in favor of a pledgee and a finder, respectively, arising 
out of their possession.119
The rule that a cause followed by delivery is sufficient to transfer ownership 
over ordinary movables is tied to one of the policies of property law. A trans­
feree of an ordinary movable is not required to ascertain whether or not the 
person with whom she is dealing is an owner. To introduce registration or 
some other formalities in relation to ordinary movables is to impede the 
smooth flow of goods in commerce. With regard to ordinary movables, to 
require formality is to put a practically impossible bureaucracy in the way of 
exchange of goods given the multitude of such products and the speed with 
which they change hands. If the purchaser’s title could be attacked at any 
time, she would be reluctant to enter into transaction relating to movables; 
this would, in turn, impede the speed and reliability of commercial transac­
tions. To avoid such inconveniences, the law has greatly simplified the re­
quirements of transfer of ordinary movables. Establish cause and receive de­
livery of an ordinary movable, you become the owner thereof has become the 
favored rule.
8.2 Special Movables
As highlighted earlier, a transfer of ownership in respect of special movables 
requires a cause120, i.e., a contract of sale or donation or a testament or a 
court order. The cause should be accompanied by registration and issuance 
of a certificate of title by a proper authority. Possession of a special movable 










Notice that the term used by the Amharic
version of Art. 1184 of the Code may be 
translated as “juridical act” while the Eng-
lish version makes mention of one type of 
juridical act namely an agreement.
See Ditu Tufa v. Jemal Shita (Sup. Ct., 
Civil File No 666/82, (Sene 1982 E.C).; 
Colonel Belayneh Mengistu v. Mugyb 
Seid, Sup. Ct., Civil File No 305/86, 
(Hidar 1987 E.C.); Hagbes PLC v. Colo­
nel Mulugeta (Sup. Ct., 1986 E.C.)
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and ordinary movables has a clear legal basis. Article 1186/2 envisages the 
issuance of special laws that single out some movables and implies that 
special steps are envisaged in their transfer.122 123 124 125 126 * * * Special movables are limited 
in number under Ethiopian property law. The list of such movables include; 
businesses, motor vehicles, construction machinery, ships , and 
non-negotiable instruments, patent and trademarks ' Considerations of 
security and safety (e.g., firearms), debt security (e.g. business chips and air­
crafts), easier identification of the true owner for the purpose of liability (e.g., 
motor vehicles) are the major policy reasons for the designation of certain 
movables as special movables. However, the factor due to which a certain 
ordinary movable joins the category of special movables appears to be dic­
tated by a variety of other interests.
When the law considers a certain movable as having special significance, it 
may designate it as a special movable. For the purpose of transfer, special 
movables are elevated to the status of immovable property. If, for example, 
Ato Kumsa owns an automobile which he sells to W/rt Semira, the latter is 
mere possessor of car (even after having paid the full price of the car) until 
Ato Kumsa surrenders the possession of the car to the buyer together with 
transfer of a certificate of title thereby enabling W/rt Semira to have a certifi­
cate of title in her own name.
8.3 Special movables versus ordinary movables
Unlike the case of ordinary movables, one cannot claim to be an owner of a 
special movable by mere possession. As a corollary, one cannot establish the 
ownership of a special movable by proving mere possession. Second, one 
cannot acquire the ownership of special movables through possession in good
122 See Article 2267.
123 See Art. 3047. See also Arts. 150-205 of 
the Commercial Code of Ethiopia.
124 See Motor Vehicle and Trailer Regulation, 
Legal Notice, 1969, No 360, Year 28 No 9.
125 See Registration and Control of Construc­
tion Machinery, Art. 4/1, 1999, No 177 Year 
29 No 61.
126 A ship must be registered. For the valid
transfer of property rights in a ship with
Ethiopian nationality the instrument which 
establishes such rights must be “drawn up in 
a recognized legal form” and registered with 
ship registers. Publication must take place as
well in order to set up such agreements 
against third parties. See Maritime Code of 
the Empire of Ethiopia, Arts. 7-8, 45, and
50, Proc. No 164, 1960, Neg. Gaz. Year 19, 
Extraordinary Issue No 1.
127 Art. 341 of the Commercial Code provides 
that the effective transfer of registered 
shares requires registration. See also Arts. 
722 & 723 of the same Code.
128 See Inventions, Minor Inventions and In­
dustrial Designs, Arts. 14 & 15, Proc. No 
123, 1995, Nega. Gaz,, No 25 Year 54.
129 Court practice as well as the practices of 
the previous Ministry of Trade and Industry, 
and now that of the Ethiopian Intellectual 
Property Office depict that ownership of 
trademarks is established not by mere use in 
commerce of a distinctive sign but by regis­
tration. A draft trademark law in pipeline is 
in line with this practice.
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faith. The belief on the part of an acquirer in the fact that the person with 
whom she concludes a sale contract holds title or is legitimate person to 
make transfer is destroyed by publicity which raises a presumption of knowl­
edge on the part of the buyer. It appears that Articles 1161-1167 of the Code 
should not be invoked with regard to special movables for publicity destroys 
any claim of good faith on the part of a third party. For the purpose of trans­
fer of ownership, special movables, e.g., business, motor vehicles and con­
struction machinery, are treated as immovable things; registration and issu­
ance of title deeds in the name of the current owner are required. It naturally 
follows from this that special movables are to be subjected to mortgage while 
non-fungible ordinary movables are to be charged with pledge.
On the other hand, the law simplifies the transfer of ordinary movables. 
Unlike, special movables the conclusion of a contract or testament followed 
by delivery effects transfer of ownership in respect of ordinary movables. 
The law desires their speedier movement in the market. A prescription that 
undergoes longer steps in the process of transfer of ordinary movables would 
be impractical and unnecessary; and that would impede their flow in 
commerce given their volume, number and frequent exchange of hands in a 
market.
8.4 Transfer of motor vehicles
In Habteab Tekle v. Esayas Like andBezabih Kelile,130 the issue was whether 
ownership relating to a certain vehicle was transferred to the appellant. The 
appellant argued that he is the owner of a car which he bought from the sec­
ond respondent after having paid the full price, on the basis of a contract of 
sale made in writing and authenticated with the proper authority. The appel­
lant, thus, claimed that the ownership of the car has been transferred to him 
even if the title certificate relating to the car was not issued in his own name. 
The appellant stated that transfer of ownership relating to the motor vehicle 
was not transferred to him owing to circumstances beyond his control, i.e. 
because the second respondent (the seller) did not pay customs duties.
The first respondent, on the other hand, argued that the car was attached to 
satisfy the debt owed to him by the second respondent, in whose name the 
car was registered. The High Court held that the car in dispute was owned by 
the second respondent. The basis for the holding of the court was that transfer 
of ownership of special movables was equivalent to that of immovable prop­
erty, and that the person in whose name a special movable such as a car is
130 Supreme Court, Civil File No. 570/80 (Sene 22, 1980 E.E.) See Getaneh Agonafer V. 
Fantu Gutema (High Ct., Civil File No 369/78 (Miazia, 1980 E.C.); Eteneh Tadele V. 
Berta Construction (High Ct., Civil File No 285/80 (Gnbot 1980E.C.).
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registered (and title certificate is issued) is the owner thereof. The High Court 
thus found that the title deed of the car in dispute bears the name of Bezabih 
Kelile (second respondent), thereby making him the owner of the car, and the 
Court decided that the car could be attached to satisfy the claim of the first 
respondent (Esayas Like).
However, the Supreme Court reversed this decision of the High Court. The 
Supreme Court invoked Articles 1186/2 and 1195 of the Code, and stated 
that he who possesses a title certificate pertaining to a special movable in his 
own name is presumed to be the owner. The Supreme Court stated that the 
presumption laid down under Article 1195 of the Code can be set aside by 
contrary evidence. According to the Supreme Court, the contrary evidence is 
one of the grounds embodied in Article 1196. The provision cited by the 
Court enables setting aside the presumption of ownership by virtue of title 
deed where it was not issued in accordance with the law or was issued by an 
authority having no jurisdiction; or where the title deed was issued on the 
basis of an invalid act; or if the person in whose name the title deed is issued 
acquired the ownership after the day on which the title deed was issued.
The Court noted that the appellant could have completed the process of trans­
fer of ownership if the second respondent had paid the required customs du­
ties. The second respondent did not pay the customs duties on the car, which 
he imported duty free and which upon transfer was required to be taxed. The 
Supreme Court further stated that the contract of sale of the car took place a 
year before the first respondent instituted debt recovery suit against the sec­
ond respondent showing that the appellant had bought the car from the sec­
ond respondent well before the attachment order. Based on these considera­
tions, the Court reversed the decision of the High Court and ruled that the 
ownership of the car had to go to the appellant.
It is submitted that the decision of the Supreme Court is wrong because the 
appellant did not rebut the presumption that the car belonged to Bezabih Ke- 
lile within the meaning of Articles 1195 and 1196 of the Code because the 
title certificate bears his name. In the decision of the Supreme Court, none of 
the three factors envisaged to rebut the presumption of ownership under Arti­
cle 1195 was shown to have existed. The Court considered the failure to pay 
tax by Bezabih Kelile as a good cause that had to go into the determination of 
rebuttal factors. Apparently, Bezabih’s failure to pay tax has obstructed the 
completion of the transfer of the title deed of the car to Habteab’s name. 
Nevertheless, that cannot be considered as one of the ingredients or constitu­
tive elements of the provisions invoked by the Supreme Court which would 
warrant setting aside the presumption of ownership contested in the appeal
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under consideration. A judgment delivered in the absence of such rebuttal 
factors would contravene a straightforward legal rule; and obviously casts 
doubt on the predictability of court decisions.
On the top of that, the fact that the appellant bought the car in dispute from 
the second respondent well before the attachment order does not have any 
legal consequence as state of mind of an acquirer is not relevant in the case 
of special movables. The car in dispute was still owned by the second respon­
dent in whose name it was registered with the pertinent authority. The Court 
should, however, be praised for recognizing that for the purpose of transfer, 
special movables are similar to immovable property and that the rules de­
signed to regulate the latter may apply, with the necessary changes, to the 
transfer of the former.
Before winding up the discussion on the transfer of motor vehicles, it is 
worth making mention of the prevailing practice. As a matter of practice, a 
contract of sale of a motor vehicle is required to be made in writing and be 
authenticated by the proper authority. The seller (or her heirs) and the buyer 
have to appear in person or via their agents, before the authority in charge of 
registering motor vehicles, and request the cancellation of the name of the 
former and enter in the register of motor vehicles the name of the buyer.
The pertinent law, however, does not require written agreement, authentica­
tion and personal appearance131 of the seller and the buyer. As matter of law, 
in the case of conventional transfer of title in respect of a motor vehicle, the 
two parties fill out and sign a form annexed to the pertinent law called Title 
Transfer Page. The seller alone delivers the completed Title Transfer Page 
along with the Car Booklet Title bearing the name of the seller to the con­
cerned authority. The concerned public authority verifies the signature of the
131 The requirement of personal appearance 
has on many occasions complicated title 
transfer process because sellers in some 
cases refuse to accompany the buyer. In 
that case, sellers ask the concerned author­
ity to effect them the transfer but in vain. 
The buyer sues the seller requesting the 
court to compel him to appear in person 
before the proper authority to facilitate the 
transfer process. Some five years ago, this 
type of litigation generated a huge contro­
versy between courts and practitioners. 
Some judges took the stance that the buyer 
had to request the authority in charge of 
registration of motor vehicles and should it
refuse to do so, she had to file a suit against 
the authority; the practitioners, on the other 
hand, insisted that the courts had to order 
the seller to personally appear before the 
authority to effect the transfer. Some courts 
however accepted plaintiffs plea and or­
dered defendants to make a personal ap­
pearance to speed up title transfer. See 
Shiferaw Tsegaye v. Wendemu Bekele 
(Sup. Ct., Civil File No 800/81 (Yekatit, 
1981.); Lema Kebede v. Muluneh Becheri 
and Tadele Beyene (Sup. Ct., Civil File 
185/89, Tahesasse 1991E.C.; Esmail Nur v. 
Fikremarkos Teklu (First Instance Ct., 
Civil File No 1000/89, Tahsas, 1991 E.C.
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seller; cancels the old title certificate and then issues a new title in favor of 
the buyer.132
8.5. Transfer of shares
Special movables as already indicated can be either tangible or intangible. 
Shares are among the most important kinds of intangible special movables. 
Under the Commercial Code of Ethiopia, shares in a business association are 
divided into two on the basis of the steps followed in transferring them: 
bearer (ordinary) shares and special shares. The reading of the relevant provi­
sions of the Commercial Code reveals the following. The transfer of owner­
ship or interest in a bearer share which perhaps may be issued only by a share 
company133 is accomplished through two steps: cause which may be a juridi­
cal act or court order or the application of the rules of intestate succession 
plus delivery of the certificate representing the proprietary interest in the 
share.134 On the other hand, the transfer of special shares follows a different 
track. Even in the case of the transfer of ownership or interest in a special 
share issued by business associations in Ethiopia, cause is indispensable but 
something more is needed for the valid transfer of such interest to flow from 
a transferor to a transferee.
Some illustrations can be provided here. In the cases of ordinary partnership, 
a partner may transfer the ownership of her share or interest short of owner­
ship such as usufruct. The third party cannot step into such partnership nor 
can she obtain interest in a share of a partner unless the transfer is approved 
by the other partners.135 If partners approve the transaction, the memoran­
dum of association needs to be amended. And third parties are affected by the 
transfer of a share in an ordinary partnership only after the amendment is de­
posited with the proper authorities and is published.136 The issues of approval 
by the other partners, amendment to the memorandum of association and the 
publicity requirements via registration and publication do apply to cases of 
transfer of a share by a general partner. But in the case of general partnership, 
a partner may constitute an interest short of ownership over her share in favor 
of third party without the consent of the other partners. Such assignment of
2 See Art. 9/2, Supra, Note 124. Similar 
lines of cases arose in connection with trans­
fer of immovable property and with similar 
court disagreements.
133 See Arts 274/1 and 510/3 of the Commer­
cial Code which prohibit a joint venture and
a private limited company from issuing se­
curities. Though there are no explicit prohi­
bitions in relation to an ordinary partnership, 
a general partnership and a limited partner-
ship, one can argue that the articles under 
consideration shall be extended to the same.
134 See Art. 340 (1&2) of the Code she who is 
possession of a certificate evidencing a 
bearer share is taken as the owner of the 
same and thus entitled to receive dividends, 
redemption and take part in general meet­
ings.
135 See Art. 250 of the Commercial Code
136 See Art. 224 of the Commercial Code
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“beneficial interest in a share” to a third party, to use the language of the 
Commercial Code, will not bind the partnership; nor does the third party get 
the status of a partner.137
In the contexts of joint venture, limited partnership and private limited com­
pany, with some variations, transfer of the share of a member of such asso­
ciations can be validly transferred to a transferee with the approval of the 
other partners, which is the fundamental element for the valid transfer of a 
share to a third party. In the case of a joint venture, under Article 274/2 of 
the Commercial Code in the absence of a contrary contractual agreement or 
perhaps legal provision,138 a unanimous agreement of the partners is required 
for a valid assignment of a share probably to a third party.139 It is not clear 
whether this article refers to the assignment of the ownership of a share or an 
interest in a share less than ownership or both types of assignments. Under 
this article, amendment of the memorandum of association is necessary but 
the very nature of the partnership will be destroyed if the amendment is pub­
licized via registration and publication of the same.
Under Article 302 of the Code, the requirement of approval is maintained in 
the case of assignment of a share in a limited partnership but it is made a bit 
lax. Here the requirement is the approval of the managers and the majority 
members of the limited partners. The consent of the general partners may be 
disregarded. The registration and publication formalities are maintained.140 
Like the case of joint venture, it is not clear if Article 302 does apply to the 
transfer of ownership or interests less than ownership or both by a partner of 
a limited partnership. Nor is Article 302 clear if it is referring to assignment 
to a third party or between the partners though it seems to refer to the former. 
In respect of transfer of shares to a third party141 in a private limited com­
pany, the following steps are required: the transfer deal must be made in writ­
ing;142 shall be approved by the majority of the members representing at least 
a three-quarters143 of the capital, and the approval shall be entered in the 
share register to be maintained by the company and be registered in the com-
137 See Art. 283 of the Commercial Code
138 The phrase “unless otherwise provided” 
under Art. 274/2 of the Commercial Code 
may refer both to a contrary provision and 
agreement
139 Id.
140 See Art. 224 of the Commercial Code
141 Assignment of share between members
can take place without restriction absent a
contrary provision in the article of associa-
tion of the company. See Art. 523/1 of the 
Commercial Code of Ethiopia
142 This means the contract must be signed by 
the parties and attested by two witnesses by 
virtue of Art. 1727 of the Code.
143 This requirement can be made more strin­
gent by the articles of association, for exam­
ple, which may set the vote of members 
representing more than 75% or even 100% 
share of the company. See Art. 523/2 of the 
Commercial Code.
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mercial register.144 If one or more of these conditions are missing, the trans­
fer contract will not bind third parties, the company and perhaps even the 
transferor and the transferee.145 In case the share of a member of a private 
limited company is attached, the third person purchasing such share may step 
into the company upon the approval of the other members.146
In relation to transfer of registered shares in a share company, there appear to 
be two conditions that are stated in Articles 333 and 341 of the Commercial 
Code that are written in the spirit of free transfer of shares. These two re­
quirements may be described as registration of the transferred share in the 
name of the transferee in the register of shareholders that shall be kept at the 
head office of the transferor’s share company147 and compliance with any 
restrictions which may be specified in the articles of association or by resolu­
tion of an extra-ordinary meeting by virtue of Article 333 of the Commercial 
Code. Failure to observe any of the two conditions of transfer will make the 
transfer a mere attempt; the person trying to effect transfer remains a share­
holder and the other person cannot enjoy the status of a shareholder. It is 
clear that Articles 333 and 341 of the Commercial Code do apply to the case 
of transfer of ownership either freely or for consideration and either before or 
after the death of the transferor; but it is not clear if these stipulations do ap­
ply to the case of the constitution of property interests (e.g. usufruct or 
pledge) which are less than transfer of full or partial joint ownership over the 
share of a shareholder.148
In respect of a cooperative society, transfer of a member’s share either as a 
whole or a portion thereof or an interest in the share less than ownership such 
as pledge and usufruct can take place.149 No transfer by a member of her 
share or benefit in a cooperative society shall be valid unless: the member 
has held such share or benefit for at least one year before the transfer and the
144 See Arts. 522 and 523 of the Code. See 
also Art. 524 of the same Code for the case 
of transfer of the share of a deceased mem­
ber of a private limited company.
145 Art. 522 of the Commercial Code appears 
to have this message. This provision may 
mean that, absent the formalities indicated 
therein, the agreement purporting to transfer 
share will have effect between the transferor 
and the transferee, but does not bind third 
parties and the company.
146 See Art. 523/5 of the Commercial Code.
147 See Art. 331 of the Commercial Code. An
analogous register of shares shall also be
maintained by any private limited company
under Art. 521 of the same Code.
148 It seems that for the exercise of such sub­
ordinate rights established over a share to be 
effective, communication to the share com­
pany is necessary, which may be inferred 
from Art. 329 of the Commercial Code for 
one cannot vote at meetings as a beneficiary 
of usufruct over a share in a given share 
company without some kind of communica­
tion to such share company about the crea­
tion of such right.
149 See Cooperative Societies Proclamation, 
Proc. 147, 1998, Art. 19, Fed.Neg.Gaz., 
Year 5th No.27.
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transfer is approved by the management committee.150 On the death of a 
member of a primary society, her share or benefit shall be transferred to one 
of her heirs designated as such in the register of society or failing such desig­
nation to her legal heir at law, and where such heir is a member or is willing 
to be a member. Where such heir is not a member or she is a member but 
does not wish to become or is not admitted as a member, she shall be paid the 
value of the share or benefit of the deceased member.151 Where the heir ac­
cepts and is accepted as a member and if the shares or benefits to be trans­
ferred to such heir exceed ten percent of the total paid up capital of the soci­
ety, the member shall be paid the difference in cash.152 The transfer or pay­
ment made to an heir shall not be reversed due to the claims made by third 
parties on the society.
In conclusion, the requirements for transfer of shares in the case of ordinary 
partnership, joint venture, general partnership and limited partnership are 
more stringent than the requirements needed to transfer share in a private 
limited company. Such conditions are relatively loose in relation to transfer 
of shares in a share company as marketability of shares is one of the hall­
marks of share companies. This informs us whether the emphasis is on the 
name, image and character of the incoming member or merely on her capital 
contribution. With the exception of private limited companies and coopera­
tive societies, the conditions under which an heir or a member may assume 
membership in other business associations are not outlined. If the memoran­
dum or articles of associations of these business associations are silent, too, 
the private limited company provisions on this point should apply with the 
necessary changes.
With the exception of the case of private limited companies, another issue 
not regulated by the Commercial Code (including the cooperative law) is the 
question of transfer of shares or interest short of ownership in a share be­
tween members. This lacuna in the pertinent law should also be covered ei­
ther by the bylaws or by analogy because such internal transfers might lead 
to undesirable concentration of decision-making power in the hands of one or 
few members of a business association. Aside from the cases of ordinary 
partnership, general partnership and cooperative societies, the conditions nec­
essary for the establishment of rights short of transfer of title over a share are 
not provided for. It is argued here that in the case of absence of a stipulation 
in the memorandum or articles of association, the general partnership provi­
sions on this point shall (with the necessary change) apply to the creation of 
rights less than transfer of ownership over shares issued by the other business 
organizations. Finally, it appears that the constitution of right of promise of
150 Id., Art. 19/1 (a& b). | 151 Id, Art. 19/3 | 152 Id.
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sale153 and preemption154 over a share in a business association shall be 
equated with transfer of shares and thus be regulated accordingly because 
such transactions may eventually lead to transfer of shares.
Concluding remarks
There are good reasons not to argue that the primary classification of things 
under the Code should be relegated to a secondary position.155 The argument 
implicitly advanced in this Commentary has been that the primary classifica­
tion of goods under the Code is complemented by the various kinds of classi­
fication of goods embodied in various parts of Book III of the Code and other 
laws.
Limiting oneself solely to the analysis of the classification of things into 
movable and immovable things cannot help one to sufficiently understand the 
property law of Ethiopia. The taxonomy of corporeal versus incorporeal 
things can be employed to explain the object of property law of Ethiopia. 
Consumable things bear upon the law of usufruct and of loan; fungible things 
affect the law of possession, of accession and of contract. Indivisibility im­
pacts the law of joint ownership and of matrimonial property. The law of 
movable things can be appreciated well if the class of ordinary and special 
movable is brought into the picture. The notion of personal property is of 
some relevance to identify resources, which are put beyond the domain of 
private ownership. And, the entire domain of state property is explained by 
the conception of private and public domain property.
In short, the subsidiary divisions are not meant to replace but to augment the 
dominant categorization of things by the Code, i.e., the law of movables and 
immovables. The student of Ethiopian property law should thus appreciate 
the role played by the multifarious kinds of subsidiary division of things 
spread over the various fields of private law of the country. _______________ ■
153 See the words “a specific chattel” under 
Art. 1411/1.
154 Id.
155 It is submitted that the division of things
into movable and immovable is and should 
be still alive in Ethiopia. If the classification 
of thing has to be organized around a key 
asset, Ethiopia at present does not have an 
asset more important than immovable prop­
erty. Ethiopia is an agrarian society; immov­
able property still retains the center stage. 
The division of things into movable and 
immovable things is intelligible to layper-
sons. Law is desired to be accessible, not 
only in terms of language but also in terms 
of idea. It is sensible to retain this division. 
In addition, the collectivization of land does 
not abolish the ownership of buildings. Fur­
ther, people can still hold rights in land. A 
holder of land can enjoy usufruct, lease her 
land for a specific period of time, donate a 
portion of her land and mortgage lease right 
in the case of an investor. These rights are 
immovables by the object to which they 
apply as they are linked to an immovable 
asset.
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